tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post6478113573278671..comments2023-05-10T08:55:47.701-07:00Comments on Richard Carrier Blogs: OEN InterviewRichard Carrierhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17577206926510030146noreply@blogger.comBlogger149125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-8026942333619109102010-09-07T14:47:33.833-07:002010-09-07T14:47:33.833-07:00That makes sense.That makes sense.Richard Carrierhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17577206926510030146noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-59968615801492369782010-09-07T13:53:49.586-07:002010-09-07T13:53:49.586-07:00PS: Partly because it speaks to your area of exper...PS: Partly because it speaks to your area of expertise, I'm tempted to draw an analogy here between the Communist/Social Democratic split and the Jewish/Christian split. The disanalogies are obvious (e.g. secular vs. religious and modern vs. ancient), so I'm only thinking about the hereditary (or sibling) relationships between distinct (sometimes opposing) ideological groups.<br /><br />mufihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01818949854678769391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-6525036069582161622010-09-04T15:24:23.463-07:002010-09-04T15:24:23.463-07:00Richard,
Sorry if I'm beating a dead horse, b...Richard,<br /><br />Sorry if I'm beating a dead horse, but I have a little free time today, and (for some reason) I feel like using it to elaborate some on my last (or penultimate) reply to you.<br /><br />Apart from our dispute over what Marx meant by "private property", I sense that you also doubt Marx's influence on social democracy (if not in the past, perhaps only in the mufihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01818949854678769391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-1561111898265166022010-08-27T08:38:28.051-07:002010-08-27T08:38:28.051-07:00Landon Hedrick said... Regarding the sheep in a fi...<b>Landon Hedrick said...</b> <i>Regarding the sheep in a field case, it's odd that your epistemology says that this is a genuine case of knowledge. The common intuition here, I think, is that this is a clear case of a true belief that's not knowledge.</i><br /><br />That depends on what you mean by "knowledge." I mean what ordinary people actually mean in practice when they sayRichard Carrierhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17577206926510030146noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-75177505861449877802010-08-27T08:37:07.694-07:002010-08-27T08:37:07.694-07:00Landon Hedrick said... Now the clear error you'...<b>Landon Hedrick said...</b> <i>Now the clear error you've made is denying that the following statement is true in the Gettier case: "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona." You have (bizarrely) claimed that this is actually false.</i><br /><br />No, I said it's either a false belief or an unjustified belief. And therefore one way or the other Gettier's problem doesn&#Richard Carrierhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17577206926510030146noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-82435091644697287022010-08-27T08:35:25.378-07:002010-08-27T08:35:25.378-07:00You both might have lost track of my point. Gettie...You both might have lost track of my point. Gettier Problem II says:<br /><br />"Smith has a justified belief that 'Jones owns a Ford'. Smith therefore (justifiably) concludes (by the rule of disjunction introduction) that 'Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona', even though Smith has no knowledge whatsoever about the location of Brown. In fact, Jones does not own a Richard Carrierhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17577206926510030146noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-57207584756735458722010-08-26T21:22:23.115-07:002010-08-26T21:22:23.115-07:00Richard,
First, I don't understand your confu...Richard,<br /><br />First, I don't understand your confusion on the issue you're debating with GJ. It looks to me like what he's trying to do is clear up a small and relatively unimportant error on your part while conceding that your main point might be right (though I doubt he agrees with even that).<br /><br />Now the clear error you've made is denying that the following Landon Hedrickhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12478038936820787129noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-24259908892593109372010-08-26T16:10:58.912-07:002010-08-26T16:10:58.912-07:00GJ:
I'm so sorry the blogger spam net keeps n...<b>GJ:</b><br /><br />I'm so sorry the blogger spam net keeps nixing your posts. That must be frustrating as hell. I keep telling it your not spamming me, so hopefully it will "learn" soon.<br /><br />Do know that the posts that disappear on your end, do actually make it to my blog, they just get shunted to comment moderation. So you don't have to keep re-sending. I'll go inRichard Carrierhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17577206926510030146noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-53116248209921509812010-08-26T16:05:45.436-07:002010-08-26T16:05:45.436-07:00GJ said... Right. In that case, both disjuncts are...<b>GJ said...</b> <i>Right. In that case, both disjuncts are false, and so the disjunction itself is false. But, again, in the Gettier II case, Brown IS in Barcelona. Why do you insist on ignoring the TRUTH (in the envisaged case) of this disjunct?</i><br /><br />Because in <i>that</i> case, the disjunct is "If A, then A or B" = "If Brown is in Barcelona, then either Brown is in Richard Carrierhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17577206926510030146noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-27837005358198963122010-08-25T14:06:44.230-07:002010-08-25T14:06:44.230-07:00Here's a sound argument:
(1) A disjunction is...Here's a sound argument:<br /><br />(1) A disjunction is true iff one or both of its disjuncts is true.<br /><br />(2) In the Gettier II case, one of the disjuncts in the disjunction 'Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' true.<br /><br />(3) Therefore, in the Gettier II case, the disjunction 'Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' is true.<br /><br />Premise (1) isGJhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05178412260930356043noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-86911864352055980992010-08-25T13:58:51.817-07:002010-08-25T13:58:51.817-07:00Here's what I wrote in an earlier post:
Richa...Here's what I wrote in an earlier post:<br /><br />Richard, I've pinpointed the problems with your argument for the claim that the disjunction in the Gettier II case is false.<br /><br />As I mentioned earlier, the disjunction cannot be false, since, in the scenario Gettier posits, one of the disjuncts (i.e. Brown is in Barcelona) is true.<br /><br />In response to my claim that you didn&GJhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05178412260930356043noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-7886622939724592462010-08-25T13:58:22.360-07:002010-08-25T13:58:22.360-07:00"Now. Think about this. It can be the case th..."Now. Think about this. It can be the case that neither Jones own a Ford nor Brown is in Barcelona. Right?"<br /><br />Yes, of course.<br /><br />"So if that case is true..."<br /><br />But in the envisaged scenario (the Gettier II case), it isn't.<br /><br />"So if that case is true, 'either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' is false. Right?"<GJhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05178412260930356043noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-33827047317023887842010-08-25T13:10:12.703-07:002010-08-25T13:10:12.703-07:00GJ said... But, as I've already remarked, it d...<b>GJ said...</b> <i>But, as I've already remarked, it doesn't matter how Smith arrives at (a).</i><br /><br />I assume you mean it doesn't matter as regarding the truth of (a). Because if Smith's belief in (a) is not JTB, then neither can be any conclusion Smith deduces from (a), even if (a) is true. You said you agree with that, so I'm hoping that means we agree the Gettier Richard Carrierhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17577206926510030146noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-77978962299577113252010-08-25T13:04:08.990-07:002010-08-25T13:04:08.990-07:00GJ said... Yes, Smith's belief isn't (or c...<b>GJ said...</b> <i>Yes, Smith's belief isn't (or can't ever have been) justified. On that we agree. But that's not the issue at hand. The issue at hand is whether (a) is true. And, of course, it is.</i><br /><br />No, it's not. Please go to the Wiki link I directed you to and refresh yourself on disjunction introduction. Here is your (a):<br /><br /><i>(a) Jones owns a Ford Richard Carrierhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17577206926510030146noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-88893711003791871322010-08-25T12:54:39.143-07:002010-08-25T12:54:39.143-07:00GJ said... Note: I've been trying to post the ...<b>GJ said...</b> <i>Note: I've been trying to post the same comment for quite some time now, but the system won't let me. It appears for a few seconds and then disappears. If the same comment ends up appearing several times, that's why.</i><br /><br />That's because Blogger just today (indeed, just an hour ago or two) initiated a new spam killing program in comments, and your Richard Carrierhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17577206926510030146noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-71065119405111440212010-08-25T12:15:53.453-07:002010-08-25T12:15:53.453-07:00I'll give it one more shot:
"(a) is fals...I'll give it one more shot:<br /><br />"(a) is false because Jones doesn't own a Ford; it doesn't matter where Brown is. You are confusing the empirical premise (where Brown actually is) with a logical disjunct, which does not say anything about what is actually the case (e.g. a true premise 'Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' requires Jones to own a Ford for it GJhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05178412260930356043noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-81340263812428830392010-08-25T12:15:20.590-07:002010-08-25T12:15:20.590-07:00Note: I've been trying to post the same commen...Note: I've been trying to post the same comment for quite some time now, but the system won't let me. It appears for a few seconds and then disappears. If the same comment ends up appearing several times, that's why.GJhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05178412260930356043noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-56202501618634396982010-08-25T09:00:02.249-07:002010-08-25T09:00:02.249-07:00Just a technical clarification, when I say "I...Just a technical clarification, when I say "If A is false, then the disjunct is false. In other words, you do not have a rule of disjunction introduction, and it is false to believe the rule applies," that only refers to the scenario in which Gettier says the facts are such that Jones does not really own a Ford (because then A is <i>false</i>, and not merely "not established";Richard Carrierhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17577206926510030146noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-34243800870864173862010-08-25T08:46:20.952-07:002010-08-25T08:46:20.952-07:00Landon Hedrick said... You can't escape this c...<b>Landon Hedrick said...</b> <i>You can't escape this case by arguing that some error in the reasoning process has made you lose justification, since there was no reasoning process--you just saw the sheep hologram and immediately formed the belief.</i><br /><br />There was a reasoning process, it just wasn't conscious. Your brain forms belief by straightforward computation. That Richard Carrierhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17577206926510030146noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-1107592155628477202010-08-25T08:27:36.105-07:002010-08-25T08:27:36.105-07:00GJ said... In Clark's early response to Gettie...<b>GJ said...</b> <i>In Clark's early response to Gettie...Clark argues, Smith justifiably believes, but doesn't know, the following true proposition: (a) Jones owns a Ford.</i><br /><br />Correct. It isn't justified true belief. It is only true belief.<br /><br /><i>Would you argue that, since Brown got lucky about Jones's owning a Ford, it's not the case that Smith Richard Carrierhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17577206926510030146noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-55136262215401652882010-08-25T08:26:49.998-07:002010-08-25T08:26:49.998-07:00GJ said... I'll take a closer look, though. If...<b>GJ said...</b> <i>I'll take a closer look, though. If I find anything, I'll let you know.</i><br /><br />I genuinely appreciate that. (So thanks for the refs. you posted further on; if this ever comes up again I'll look them up)<br /><br /><i>This may bore you, but I'm wondering if your approach to the Gettier problem can handle all Gettier-style cases.</i><br /><br />Just FYI Richard Carrierhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17577206926510030146noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-34575110851763104672010-08-25T08:26:25.667-07:002010-08-25T08:26:25.667-07:00GJ said... (a) Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Ba...<b>GJ said...</b> <i>(a) Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. But it's simply NOT the case that (a) is false. It's true in virtue of the truth of the second disjunct.</i><br /><br />(a) is false because Jones doesn't own a Ford; it doesn't matter where Brown is. You are confusing the empirical premise (where Brown <i>actually is</i>) with a logical disjunct, which does not Richard Carrierhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17577206926510030146noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-66396062074242007222010-08-19T16:00:30.044-07:002010-08-19T16:00:30.044-07:00Landon,
"Closure gets you from a justified b...Landon,<br /><br />"Closure gets you from a justified belief in 'A' to a justified belief in 'A or B', since by hypothesis 'A' is justified. Maybe the disjunction introduction does something tricky here, I'm undecided at the moment."<br /><br />Disjunction introduction does do something tricky here, but, like you, I'm not sure what. <br /><br />"GJhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05405004325909934516noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-41501434678947039272010-08-07T17:03:01.324-07:002010-08-07T17:03:01.324-07:00GJ,
I'm not sure that infallibilism is "...GJ,<br /><br />I'm not sure that infallibilism is "obviously false." It strikes me as pretty implausible, but I think it is defended by some philosophers (e.g. Clayton Littlejohn). By the way, Linda Zagzebski has argued in "The Inescapability of Gettier Problems" that any theory of knowledge retains the assumption of fallibilism will run into Gettier counter-instances.<Landon Hedrickhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12478038936820787129noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-36959219.post-23200461653306850882010-08-07T15:15:47.983-07:002010-08-07T15:15:47.983-07:00Richard, I've pinpointed the problems with you...Richard, I've pinpointed the problems with your argument for the claim that the disjunction in the Gettier II case is false.<br /> <br />As I mentioned earlier, the disjunction cannot be false, since, in the scenario Gettier posits, one of the disjuncts (i.e. Brown is in Barcelona) is true.<br /><br />In response to my claim that you didn't demonstrate that the disjunction is false, you GJhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05178412260930356043noreply@blogger.com